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Abstract. This paper represents an attempt to reconcile some general intuitions provided by Daron Acemoglu and 
James A. Robinson in the book “Why Nations Fail” with the case of the deep regional disparities in the economic 
performances observed within the “Western” European Union during the period 2001-2015. By adopting an approach to 
growth analysis based on binary response models, this paper quantifies the extent to which the quality of government 
institutions has shaped regional economic performances in the European Union throughout the period comprising the 
Great Recession. Empirical results show that: 1) The higher is the quality of institutions, the higher is the probability that 
a region with high income per capita will grow above the levels of the European Union as a whole. 2) The higher is the 
quality of institutions, the lower is the probability that a low-income region will grow below the levels of European Union 
as a whole. 3) The higher is the quality of institutions, the higher (lower) is the probability that any region, regardless of 
its income per capita, will outperform (underperform) the European Union as a whole. 4) The higher is the quality of 
Institutions, the lower is the probability that a region will “fail” to grow.  
 
Keywords. Quality of Institutions; Probit; Regions; European Union, Economic Performances 




The period 2001-2015 was characterized by very poor regional economic performances in the 
old Member states European Union (EU-15) 1 . However, despite the financial crisis and 
economic downturn that affected the European countries and in particular in the Euro area, 
some regions performed much better than others while a group of 44 regions recorded negative 
rates of average economic growth. The worst economic performances were generally observed 
in the Italian and Greek regions that are also the region with the poorest quality of government 
institutions. 
The objective of this essay is to analyse the role of the quality of government in shaping 
regional performances and intends to contribute to the existing literature about the relationship 
between economic growth and institutions by adopting an ex-post approach for the analysis of 
                                                    
1 By EU-15 it is meant the group of countries from Western Europe that have progressively joined the 
European Community/European Union long before the waves of enlargements towards the East during the 
2000s 




economic growth. Regions will be grouped according to their economic performances compared 
to the performance of the whole European Union over the period 2001-2015 and four binary 
dependent variables will be constructed. These binary dependent variables in the dataset will 
take on value 1 if one of the four performances is observed or 0 otherwise. Next, a Probit model 
will be estimated for each of the four cases in order to explain to what extent institutional quality 
has shaped regional economic performances during the period under analysis.  
The empirical findings are remarkably interesting. Both the educational attainment of the 
working-age population and the industrial sector generally play a positive role in shaping 
regional performances. However, in the long run, the quality of institutions turns out to be 
always the ultimate determinant of the increase/decrease in the probability that a region will be 
recording a positive or negative economic performance. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Neoclassical Growth Model and its empirical extensions for growth analysis have traditionally 
focused on exogenous factors such as saving rate, population growth and technological 
progress (Solow, 1956). Within the stream of the neoclassical approach, Mankiw et al. (1991) 
have also remarked the relevant role played by human capital in the transitional dynamics to the 
steady state output per worker.  Other streams of theoretical and empirical literature about 
economic growth have focused on human capital and endogenous technological change 
arguing that innovation is the engine of economic growth and it is endogenously generated 
(Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988).  The consequence of the fact that human capital accumulation is 
not subjected to decreasing returns as physical capital can explain the discontinuity or the slow 
speeds of convergence often observed within groups of regions or countries (Martin and 
Sunley, 1998). 
By including variables that can broadly be considered as proxies for institutional quality in a 
cross-section of 98 countries, Barro (1991) finds out that economic growth is positively related 
to measures of political stability and negative related to the market distortions induced in the 
economy by the political sphere. Also in a panel of around 100 countries with data collected 
from 1960 to 1990, Barro (1996) finds out that for a given level of initial GDP per Capita, the 
growth rate is enhanced among others also by better maintenance of the rule of law. 
As Acemoglu et al. (2005:397) remark, although cultural and geographical forces also matter 
for economic performances, differences in the quality of institutions are the major source of 
cross-country differences in economic growth and prosperity.  North (1990:3) defines institutions 
as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. According to Alonso (2009:9), institutional structure defines the 
incentives and penalties that influence the behaviour of agents and shape collective action. 
Therefore, in the uncertain world in which independent agents operate with imperfect 
information, sound institutions reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and facilitate social 
coordination.  




Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that rich countries are rich because they have 
inclusive institutions, while poor countries are poor because they have extractive institutions. By 
“institutions” also the authors mentioned above mean the rules that govern and organize the 
economic and political life. Inclusive institutions create the fundamental incentives and 
opportunities that stimulate investment and entrepreneurship, while extractive economic 
institutions consist of a system where a small group of people is permitted to exploit the rest of 
the population that is kept out the political and economic process. However, throughout history, 
most of the societies have been ruled by extractive economic institutions with different levels of 
intensity 2.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) individuate the origins of the economic backwardness of former 
Western colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the fact that colonial powers set up 
extractive state structures in those territories.  Those institutions did not introduce much 
protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against the 
government because the explicit aim of the Europeans settled in those overseas territories was 
the sole extraction of resources. This colonization strategy and the associated institutions 
contrast with the institutions Europeans set up in other colonies where they settled in large 
numbers, for example, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Acemoglou and 
Robinson, 2008:4).  
At the same time, the quality of institutions also affected the economic development of the 
colonial powers themselves.  Achemoglu et al. (2002) argue that the discovery of America in 
1492 benefited much more, in terms of economic development, the countries that had already 
established a systems of checks and balance to the Monarchy, as Great Britain and the 
Netherlands, rather than countries where the monarchy was highly absolutist, as in the case of 
Spain or Portugal. 
The institutionalist explanation of disparities in economic development has been well 
received in academic circles and in the sphere of international organisations (Alonso, 2009:12). 
As a matter of facts, it has progressively arisen an increasing recognition among practitioners in 
international organizations that corruption and other aspects of poor governance have 
substantial and adverse effects on economic development (Mauro, 2002).  Mauro (1995) also 
finds out a negative relationship between the malfunctioning of institutions and investment rate, 
therefore between institutional inefficiency (and corruption) and economic growth. 
Somewhat contrary to the capital accumulation model of regional growth, institutional 
theorists argue that differences in growth and prosperity across countries, regions and cities are 
strictly related to the quality of political and economic institutions that shape the economic 
activity (Huggins and Thompson, 2017).  
                                                    
2 In relation to “extractive” economic institutions in the ancient history, prominent historian MacMullen 
(1988) has argued that also the decline and consequent fall of the Roman Empire was mainly due to the 
progressive erosion of the solidity of government institutions pursued by a small group of high-ranking 
bureaucrats and military leaders. The spread of corruption and informal practices had long term 
devastating effects on the political and economic integrity of the institutional foundations Roman Empire. 
 




By estimating the contribution to income levels of different forces like geography and trade in 
a large sample of countries, also Rodrik et al. (2002) find out that the quality of institutions is the 
main determinant of income levels. Roughly said, after controlling for institutional quality, in the 
output of the regression model measures of geography and trade result at best to exert weak 
effects on income levels while the institutional quality remains the main determinant of 
economic development.  
Turning to the more focused topic of regional performances in Europe, a wide body of 
literature has been produced to study the relationship between economic growth and the quality 
of institutions. However, most of these studies use “quality of institutions” as a predictor of 
economic growth with a “neoclassical approach” where economic growth is regressed on the 
natural logarithm of initial levels of GDP per capita and other control variables, including quality 
of institutions or regional geographic spillover (Ascani et al., 2012; Harris, 2008; Feldkircher, 
2006; Rodríguez-Pose, 1998; Pons-Novell and Viladecans-Marsal, 1998). Other empirical 
studies assess the impact of the quality of institutions on innovative capacity and investment in 
European regions or countries (Rodriguez -Pose and Di Cataldo, 2018; Canton and Solera, 
2016). 
This essay contributes to the existing literature by modelling the relationship between 
regional economic performances and the quality of institutions with an econometric approach 
based on binary response models. These models attempt to estimate the marginal probability 
that a certain economic performance will be attained in a region, conditional on the quality of 
institutions and other control variables commonly used in the analysis of economic growth. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
The annual data are averaged from 2001 to 2015 for each of the 195 sampling units and the 
dataset includes 14 NUTS-1 territories (Belgium: Brussels; Germany: Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Turingen; France: Ile-de-France and Nord-Pas-de-Calais; Greece: Attica; Spain: 
Community of Madrid; United Kingdom: Northern Ireland), 1 NUTS-0 territory (Luxembourg) and 
180 NUTS-2 regions3 located in EU-15 countries4.  The sample is composed only by the regions 
of Western Europe where the heterogeneity in terms of initial conditions is smaller (despite the 
remarkable cross country differences) than the cross regional heterogeneity observed in the 
post-enlargement European Union. Therefore, regions of transition economies from Eastern 
Europe are not included in the sample because they outperformed the average rate of growth of 
the European Union despite their very low institutional quality and this is mainly due to the fact 
                                                    
3 Nuts 0 territories of Cyprus and Malta are excluded from the sample together with the 7 Nuts-2 
Territories of Norway because of the lack of the availability of data concerning Quality of Institutions and 
because Norway is not a member state of the Union.  
4 Here, by EU-15 group it is meant all the Western member states of the European Union excluding 
Malta and Cyprus. 




that they started with very low levels of income per capita their process of transition and 
economic integration with the Western countries of the European Union. 
Data related to GDP per Capita and investment rates are sourced from Cambridge 
Econometrics European Regional Database.   
The data concerning the educational attainment of the population are sourced from the 
regional database made available online from the European Commission.  
Data related to the quality of regional governments consist of the EQI Score developed by 
Charron at al (2015) from The Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenburg 
and made available in the European Quality of Government Index (EQoG) database 
downloadable from the website of the Swedish academic institution.  EQoG database is 
relatively new, and the indicators have been developed only for the years 2010, 2013 and 2017.   
Given the fact that the “success” or the “failure” of institutions reflects a wide range of 
historical, local, sociological and anthropological factors (Alesina, 2014; Greif, 1994), it is 
possible to suppose that changes and adjustments in the quality of institutions occur very 
slowly. Also, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:435) argue that replacing extractive institutions 
with inclusive institutions is neither an automatic nor a simple process. Indeed, it is often 
needed a convergence of historical or political factors, in particular, a critical conjuncture 
combined with a broad coalition of people that support and push for the reforms. 
As a consequence, for the purpose of this analysis, the choice of “EQI Score” of the year 
2013 as a predictor of economic performances over the period 2001-2015 represents a very 
reasonable strategy to remedy the fact that the selected time series data for institutional quality 
are not available on an annual basis from 2001 to 2015. 
The estimation methodology applied in this essay partially follows the methodology 
developed by Ainginger et al. (2013).   
Regions are assigned to 4 groups according to their economic performances over the period 
2001-2015 and their initial income per capita levels: 
1. Group A (Taking off from Above): Regions with GDP per Capita above EU GDP per 
Capita level in 2001 growing faster than the EU average over the period 2001 – 
2015.  
2. Group B (Declining from above): Regions with GDP per Capita above EU GDP per 
Capita level in 2001 growing below the EU average over the period 2001 – 2015 
3. Group C (Converging from below): Regions with GDP per Capita below EU GDP per 
Capita level in 2001 growing above the EU average over the period 2001 – 2015 
4. Group D (Diverging from below): Regions with GDP per Capita below EU GDP per 
Capita level in 2001 growing below the EU average over the period 2001 – 2015 
 
Regions assigned to group A and C will be further grouped together (A&C) in another group of 
“Successful regions”. Regions assigned to group B and D will be further grouped together (B & 
D) in another group of “Unsuccessful regions”. Regions that recorded negative rates of income 
per capita growth will be grouped in the group of “failed” regions (Group E).  




The methodology developed in order to construct the binary dependent variables is 
explained in Table 1. 
 








Has the region 
been 
“Declining”? 













































































































































































































































After having constructed the four binary variables, with the Probit estimation, it will be 
possible to estimate at first instance what are the structural features that increase (decrease) 
the probability that a region will be “Taking-off” (Diverging) with respect to European Union as a 
whole given its GDP per Capita in 2001. Then it will be possible to estimate both the conditional 
probabilities that a region will be “Successful” (or Unsuccessful) at performing better than the 
European Union as a whole in terms of economic growth and the conditional probabilities that a 
region will “fail” (negative growth) regardless of its GDP per capita levels in 2001.  
 
3.1. Some Stylized facts about regional economic performances in the European Union 
As already mentioned in the introduction, the period 2001-2015 was characterized on average 
by very poor regional economic performances because of the fact that most of the countries of 
the EU (and in particular in the EMU) were hit by severe financial and economic crises. Figure 1 
reports the average rates of regional economic growth observed within the EU as a whole and 
within the different subgroups of the EU.  





Figure 1.  Average annual regional GDP per capita growth by groups of countries (2001-2015) 
 
As it possible to notice from Figure 1, regional economic growth in the European Union was 
essentially driven by the “converging” economies of Eastern Europe. Indeed, EU-15 regional 
average economic growth was nearly the half of the economic growth observed in the EU-28 
over the period 2001-2015. 
Figure 2 shows the statistical maps of regional performances A, B, A&C and B&D as 
formalized through the methodology developed in Table 1. As it is possible to note in Figure 2, 
most of regions with GDP per capita lower than the European Union GDP per capita in 2001 
that underperformed the European Union (diverging regions) are located in Southern Europe 
while the regions that outperformed the European Union “from above” are mainly located in 
Central and Northern Europe (South-East and North Germany, most of Austrian regions, 
Scotland, North of England and Ile-de-France). Basque Country is the only Southern European 
region that has been “taking-off from above”. 
At the same time, most of the regions that have been “diverging from below” are located in 
Spain, Portugal, Italian “Mezzogiorno” while most of the regions that have been “unsuccessful” 
(either by “diverging from below” or “declining from above”) are located in Northern and Central 
Italy, France and in the Southern area of Great Britain (South of England and Wales) plus 
Northern Ireland. However, the situation of Spain, Great Britain and France should not be 
absolutely confused with the situation of Italy and Greece. Indeed, as shown in Figure 3, most 
of the French (14 out 21), British (Wells and South of England) and Spanish (Community of 
Madrid, Catalonia and Navarra) “declining from above” regions or Spanish and Portuguese (all 
the regions excepted Metropolitan Area of Lisbon) “diverging from below” regions 
underperformed the European Union by recording positive (but lower than the EU) rates of 
economic growth. All the Italian “declining from above” and Italian and Greek “diverging from 














Figure 3. European regions by group. 
 




3.2. Quality of Institutions in the European regions. A Graphical Overview  
The European Quality of Government Index (EQI) for the year 2013 has been developed by the 
Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenburg, and it is the result of a regional 
survey answered by a large sample of 85.000 citizen respondents5. The data focus “on both 
perception and experiences with public sector corruption along with the extent to which citizens 
believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality”. Figure 4 
shows the statistical maps of the regional EQI score as calculated for each region of the 
European Union (when the index it is not available at NUTS-2 level, the NUTS-2 region will take 
on the score of its upper-level territorial unit NUTS-1). 
As Figure 4 shows, EQI score tends to be generally very high or high in Northern and 
Central Europe (Scandinavian, German, Austrian and British regions), in France and the 
majority of regions of the Iberian Peninsula. At the same time, the wealthiest regions of 
Northern Italy like Lombardy have the approximately the same EQI score of the Madrid 
Community and of Catalonia while all the regions of Mezzogiorno have the same EQI score of 
the most of the Greek regions. The only Italian region with a “northern European” EQI score is 
the NUTS2 region ITH1 (Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol). The regions with the lowest EQI in the 
Western countries of the European Union are Campania and Calabria that are also two of the 
poorest regions of Italy and among the poorest regions in the EU-15. The extent to which the 
Quality of Institutions affects regional economic performances can be easily shown by plotting 
the marginal effects of the EQI score on the predicted probability that a region will be “taking off 




                                                    






Figure 4 - EQI Score






Figure 5. Probability of “taking-off” from above and “diverging” from below.  
 
As it is possible to note in Figure 5a, the higher is the EQI score, the higher is the probability 
that a region will be “Taking-off” from above. At the same time, the higher is the EQI score, the 
lower is the marginal probability that a region will be “diverging” from below (Figure 5b). Said 
more technically, as the Quality of Institutions tends to the maximum score, the predicted 
probability for a region to be “Taking off” approaches 1, while the predicted probability for a 
region to be “Diverging from below” approaches 0. 
 
4. The Specification of the Model: Institutions in the Long-run 
Probit regression is nonlinear regression model specifically utilized for binary dependent 
variables. A model with binary dependent variable models the probability that Y=1 when a 
change in the predictor X occurs. Cumulative probability distribution function (c.d.f.) is used in 
Probit regressions because it produces probabilities between 0 and 1 in the form (Y=1|X). 
Therefore, when Y is binary, its conditional expectation is the marginal probability that the 
variable Y equals 1, and the expected change arising from a change in X is the change in the 
probability that Y=1 (Stock and Watson, 2012:431). For the Probit model F(x´β) is the 
cumulative density function (C.d.f) of a standard normal distribution  
 
𝑌 𝐹 𝑋`𝛽 𝛷 𝑧 𝑑𝑧
`
 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛷 𝑧 ∈ 0,1     [1] 
 
Therefore, coefficient estimate β represents the increase/decrease in the z-score of the 
probability Y=1|X when X changes by 1 unit. The model is specified as follows: 
 
Pr 𝑌 1|𝑋`𝑠 𝛷 𝛼 𝛽 𝑋 , 𝛽 𝑋 , 𝛽 𝑋 , ,    [2] 
 
where Y denotes binary dependent variable that can take on value 1 if a region has recorded a 




certain economic performance (“diverging”, “converging”, “unsuccessful”/“successful” or “failed”) 
and 0 otherwise. X1 denotes the EQI score calculated in 2013, X2 denotes a vector of control 
variables related to sectorial investment rates to GDP or the regional economic structure while 
X 3 denotes the vector of control variables related to the educational attainment of the working-
age population. All the variables other than EQI score are expressed as annual averages during 
the period 2001-2015. 
The model will be estimated for four cases: 
Regions “taking-off” from above, regions “diverging” from below, unsuccessful regions (GDP 
per capita growth<EU GDP per capita growth), or symmetrically, successful regions (GDP per 
capita growth > EU GDP per capita growth)6 failed regions (GDP per capita growth < 0). 
Higher EQI score is expected to increase the probability that a region will be “taking off from 
above” or be “Successful” while it is expected to reduce the probability that a region will be 
“Diverging from below” or be “Unsuccessful”. Investment rates to GDP are expected to affect 
the binary variable according to the sector of the economy (Industry, Market services, Non-
Market services, Agriculture and Constructions) while labour force higher education is expected 
to confirm the results common to the empirical literature about economic growth.   
In the tables of the regression outputs, I report directly the marginal effects or the predicted 
probability that Y=1 given the values of X1 , X2 …, Xk  calculated by computing the z-value. 
Indeed, the coefficient β1 is the change in z-value arising from a unit change in X1, holding 
constant X2 …, X. The Probit model is fitted with Maximum Likelihood estimator and also 
provides a Pseudo R Square7, 8. In order to provide a more in-depth analysis, I also run the 
same models with variables averaged during the period 2001-2008. With this strategy, it is 
possible both to exclude the crisis period characterized by a general drop in regional economic 







                                                    
6  The coefficient estimates and their statistical significance of the models with “Successful” or 
“Unsuccessful” regions are exactly the same with opposite signs. Therefore, in the paper only the 
regression output for “Unsuccessful” regions (regions “declining from above” and “diverging from below”) is 
reported 
7 In Table 13 of Appendix 2, I will report the regression diagnostic for the detection of the eventual 
presence of multicollinearity in the model. As it will be shown, no multicollinearity is detected between the 
variables in the model. 
8 Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix 3 show the plots of the marginal probabilities estimated with the Probit 
technique and reported in Tables 2, 3 4 and 5 
 




Table 2. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group A.  




.27*** .22***    
[.075] [.08] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
.003   .007**    
[.003] [.003] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
-.002    -.0006       
[.003] [.003] 




Investment in Construction to GDP 
-.07    
- 
[.07] 





Investment in Market Services GDP 
.01    
- 
[.009] 








Average GVA Construction  
 
  -.022    
[.01] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
  -.014*  
 [.008] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
-.002 
  [.01] 
Average GVA Agriculture - 
-.028*    
[.01] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 79.86 85.09 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.337 0.363 
*** Statistically significant at 1% **. Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 









Table 3. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group D.   




-.12.5***   -.137*** 
[.03] [.03] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
.003    .001    
 [.003] [.003] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
.005** .003*   
[.002] [.002] 
Investment in Industry to GDP 
-.009    
- 
[.01] 
Investment in Construction to GDP 
  -.027    
- 
[.03] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
.026**    
- 
[.01] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
.010    
- 
[.007] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
.021    
- 
[.03] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
.008    
[.005] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
.012    
[.01] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
.026***    
[.007] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
.013   
[.008] 
Average GVA Agriculture  
 
.021    
[.03] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 124,04 139,35 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,58 0,65 
*** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 
Brackets [ ] 
  




Table 4. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group B + Group D. 




- .27***     -.24***   
[.08] [.08] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
.002       -.0047    
[.004] [.004] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
.013***    .007*   
[.004] [.004] 
Investment in Industry to GDP 
-.037**   
- 
[.01] 
Investment in Construction to GDP 
-.07   
- 
[.05] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
.005    
- 
[.01] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
.002    
- 
[.01] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
.07    
- 
[.067] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
-.014**    
[.006] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
-.015   
[.01] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
.001    
[.009] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
.005   
[.01] 
Average GVA Agriculture  
 
.01   
[.01] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 94,99 100,91 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,34 0,36 
*** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 
Brackets [ ] 
  




Table 5. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group E. 




-.19***    -.18***   
[.038] [.03] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
-.006**    -.011***    
[.003] [.003] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
  -.0001    -.001    
[.002] [.002] 
Investment in Industry to GDP 
-.013    
 
[.01] 
Investment in Construction to GDP 
.007    
 
[.03] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
  -.017    
 
[.012] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
.005   
 
[.008] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
.006    
 
[.03] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
-.016***    
[.005] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
  -.007    
[.01] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
  -.011**    
[.005] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
-.012**    
[.006] 
Average GVA Agriculture  
 
  -.006    
[.008] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 111,09 120,39 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,54 0,58 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 








5. Robustness check of the model: Institutions in the short-run 
In order to further investigate the role of the quality of institutions in shaping regional economic 
performances in the EU-15, I run the same model with annual data averaged during the period 
2001-2008. With this strategy, it will be possible to insulate the pre-crisis period and compare 
the long run and short run results of the econometric analyses in order to assess to what extent 
the quality of government institutions makes European regions more resilient to economic 
shocks. As already mentioned the data for European Quality of Government Index (EQI score) 
developed by the Quality of Government Institute are available only for the years 2010, 2013 
and 2017. Given the fact that changes in the quality of institutions occur very slowly it is 
plausible to suppose that the quality of government institutions observed in 2010 in the 
European regions was not sensibly different from the quality of government institutions that had 
characterised the period 2001-2008. As a consequence, the EQI score of the year 2010 
calculated on a survey of 34.000 respondents is chosen as a predictor of regions economic 
performance. 
Also, the Quality of Government Institute remarks that “a relative stability in quality of 
government can be noted across the three editions” of the database and such stability further 
induces to confidently conjecture that quality of government institutions in 2010 was nearly the 
same of the quality of regional institutions of the previous years. The relationship between the 
quality of government institutions and economic performances in the short run is expected at 
best weak or negligible. Indeed, countries or regions can experience short run fast economic 
growth, convergence or growth accelerations regardless the quality of government institutions 
and as a consequence of episodes of speculation on real estate, stock market and commodity 
prices that drive economic growth until the bubble bursts and the subsequent macroeconomic 
adjustment. Furthermore, during the periods of financial euphoria or financial/housing bubbles 
regions or countries with lower income levels can experience short-run periods of fast economic 
growth and convergence because of high debt-driven investment rates and decreasing returns 
to physical capital. Anyways, stable economic development is ensured in the long run only by 
sound government institutions as pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). 
The results of the regressions are reported in tables 6, 7, 8 and 9. As it is possible to note, 
the quality of institutions is the main factor behind a “taking-off from above” experienced form a 
region in the short run, while the quality of institutions plays no effects in shaping other regional 
economic performances. 
  




Table 6. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group A – robustness check. 




.29***      .34***    
[.06] [.06] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
.010***   .011***    
[.003] [.004] 
Working Age Population with 
Primary Education or Less 
.0028    .002   
[.003] [.003] 




Investment in Construction to GDP 
.045    
 
[.04] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
-.067***    
 
[.01] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
.03   
 
[.02] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
  -.008*    
 
[.05] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
.00080 
   [.005] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
.028**   
[ .014] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
-.014*    
[.008] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
-.012    
[.009] 
Average GVA Agriculture 
 
-.048**    
[.02] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 79,86 85,09 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,31 0,26 
*** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 
Brackets [ ] 
  




Table 7. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group B – robustness check. 




-.042    -.039    
[.03] [.03] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
-.005    -.008*    
[.004] [.004] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
.003    .0034*    
[.002] [.001] 




Investment in Construction to GDP 
-.04    
 
[.03] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
.011   
 
[.01] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
.008    
 
[.01] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
.003   . 
 
[.03] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
-.001     
[.006] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
.003     
[.018] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
   .023***    
[.008] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
-.0083    
[.009] 
Average GVA Agriculture  
 
-.008    
[.009] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 33,38 64,4 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,19 0,37 
*** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10%. Standard Error in 
Brackets [ ] 
  




Table 8. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group B + Group D – robustness check. 




.013 .006    
[.06] [.06] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
-.016*** -.018***    
   [.005] [.004] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
.001    .0062*    
[.003] [.003] 
Investment in Industry to GDP 
-.01    
 
[.01] 
Investment in Construction to GDP 
-.08     
 
[.05] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
-.01    
 
[.01] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
-.003    
 
[.027] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
-.09    
 
[.06] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
-.015**    
[.006] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
-.072***    
[.015] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
-.011   
[.009] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
-.021**    
[.009] 




Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 22,5 100,91 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,18 0,19 
*** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 
Brackets [ ] 
  




Table 9. Marginal effects on probability Y=1|X. Group E – robustness check. 
Model 9 9b 
 
EQI Score 
.0008     .008    
[.01] [.01] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
-.001    -.001    
[.001] [.001] 
Working Age Population Primary 
Education or Less 
-.0005    -.00005    
[.0007] [.0009] 
Investment in Industry to GDP 
-.002     -.002    
[.005] [.002] 
Investment in Construction to GDP 
-.003    
 
[.01] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
.001     
 
[.004] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
.010    
 
[.006] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
-.016   
 
[.02] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
-.002    
[.002] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
.003    
[.004] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
-.003    
[.003] 
Average GVA Market Services  
 
  .0001   
[.001] 
Average GVA Agriculture  
 
-.005    
[.008] 
Obs. 195 195 
LR chi2 18,27 12,26 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0,54 0,41 
*** Statistically significant at 1% ** Statistically significant at 5% *Statistically significant at 10 / Standard Error in 









Despite the results of the model perfectly fit the expectations derived from the theory and the 
previous empirics in the literature, it is surprising to empirically demonstrate how the quality of 
institution turns out to be the most important determinant of regional performances even 
compared to investment rate in highly productive sectors as the manufacturing industry. In 
particular, when controlling for sectorial investment rates to GDP, a percentage point increase in 
EQI score is expected to determine an increase of 27% in the probability that a region will be 
“taking off from above” (Table 2 Model 1a) while it is expected to reduce by 15% the probability 
that a region will be “diverging” from below (table 3, Model 1a). 
The results of the model reported in Table 4 (Model 1a) also tells that a one-unit increase in 
the EQI score will reduce by 27% the probability that a region will be “unsuccessful” either 
“declining from above” or “diverging from below”. Symmetrically, a one-unit increase in the EQI 
score will increase by 27% the probability that a region will be successful either in “taking off 
from above” or “converging” from below.  
Beside the quality institutions, the role investment in manufacturing industry to GDP seems 
to be very relevant for increasing the probability that a region will be “taking off from above”, as 
reported in Table 2, and reducing the probability that a region will be “diverging from below” or 
being “unsuccessful” (Table 3 and Table 4). 
As regards the “failed” regions (table 5), the industrial sector size plays a marginal role while 
the EQI score is the main determinant of regional performances because a one-unit increase in 
the EQI score is expected to reduce by 19% the probability that a region will "fail” to grow. 
Human capital proxied as the educational attainment of the working-age population generally 
plays an effect in shaping regional performances, in particular the labour force with primary 
education or less is expected to increase the probability that a region will be “diverging from 
below” or “unsuccessful” while the labour force with tertiary education is expected to reduce the 
probability that a region will fail to grow. 
 
7. Conclusions 
As in the most of the analyses on economic growth, I provided a model that includes indicators 
for human capital (proxied as the educational attainment of the working-age population) and 
physical capital accumulation (investment rate in the different sectors of the economy). 
However, empirical evidence from Western European regions shows that the quality of 
government plays a preeminent role in shaping regional economic performances.  The 
coefficient estimates for the explanatory variable EQI are always statistically significant within a 
99% confidence interval and their magnitude is always remarkably much larger than the 
magnitude of coefficient estimates for variables like investment rate in manufacturing industry 
(or the size of the industrial sector) or the educational attainment of the working-age population.  
According to the estimations, EQI score is the most relevant variables in explaining positive 
(“taking off from above” or “successful”) and negative (“diverging from below” or “unsuccessful”) 




economic performances. The results of the model clearly confirm the thesis of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) about to the tight relation between quality of institution and failures of nations, 
or regions in our case. As shown in the statistical map (Figure 4), most of the regions with very 
low indices of the Quality of Government Institutions are the regions of Southern Europe, in 
particular, the Italian and the Greek ones. Those regions were also the ones that suffered more 
from the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis (they have been regions “diverging from 
below”) while most of the Northern Italian regions with income higher than EU income levels in 
2001 have been “declining” from above or unsuccessful. 
According to the estimations, a one-unit increase in EQI score is expected to increase by 
27% the probability that a region will be “taking off from above” (Table 2, model 1a), while it will 
reduce by 12.5% the probability that a region will be “diverging from below” (Table 3, Model 2a). 
Finally, a one-unit increase in the EQI score is expected to reduce by 27% the probability that a 
region will be “unsuccessful” either by “diverging from below” or “declining from above” (Table 4, 
Model 3a)10.  
The empirical finding of this paper are very relevant for governments in diverging or declining 
regions of the European Union, mainly in the peripheral countries of the EMU. Indeed, the 
results show how the Quality of Institutions ends up to be the most relevant determinant of 
regional economic performances.  In particular, the regression output for “diverging from below” 
regions (Table 3) clearly shows that for regions, whose per capita income is lower than the per 
capita income of the European Union as a whole, the quality of institutions is much more 
important than other variables such as the investment rate in manufacturing sector or it size. 
Indeed, according to the coefficient estimates reported in Table 3 (Model 2a), a one-unit 
increase in the EQI score is expected to reduce by 12.5% the probability that a region will be 
“diverging from below” while the coefficient estimates investment rate in industry or the size of 
the industrial sector are not statistically significant. 
Quality of Government Institutions exerts a huge impact on the probability that a region will 
be “unsuccessful” by either “diverging from below” or declining from above”. According the 
regression output reported in table 4 (model 3a), while a 1% increase in investment rate in 
industry is expected to reduce by 3.7% the probability that a region will be “unsuccessful”, a 
one-unit increase in the EQI score is expected to reduce by 27% (more than one quarter) the 
probability that a region will be “unsuccessful” either by “declining from above” (as in the case of 
all the Northern and Central Italian regions) or “diverging from below” as in the case of the 
Greek regions. 
Last but not least, according to the estimations reported in Table 5, one unit increase in the 
EQI index is expected to reduce by 19% (Model 4a) or 18% (Model 4b) the probability that a 
region will fail to grow. During the period under analysis 20 Italian regions out of 21 and 10 
Greek regions out of 13 recorded negative average GDP per capita growth, meaning that over 
the same period, 31 regions out of 44 European Regions that recorded negative economic 
                                                    
10 Symmetrically a one-unit increase in EQI score is expected to increase by 27% the probability that a 
region will be “successful” with a 99% confidence interval 




growth were Greek or Italian.  The two countries are also the countries with the lowest quality of 
regional institutions in terms of EQI score. Given these further considerations and the empirical 
evidence provided by the econometric estimations, it is straightforward to conclude that the 
quality of institutions is the main determinant of regional economic performances in the long run. 
As a consequence, it is possible to assert that the poor quality of institutions has hampered both 
the resilience of Northern Italian regions to the financial crisis and their ability to “take-off from 
above” as in the case of the most industrialized regions located in Germany.  At the same time, 
the poor quality of government institutions has remarkably contributed to the process of 
“divergence from below” observed in the Greek and Southern Italian regions. As empirically 
estimated and reported in Table 3, the quality of government institutions is much more relevant 
than the investment rate in the manufacturing industry for lower-income regions to avoid further 
divergence from the EU income levels. 
Furthermore, by comparing the results estimated for the same model in the long run and in 
the short run, it is also possible to assert that the soundness of government institutions makes 
regions more resilient to financial crises or macroeconomic shocks. As a matter of facts, Greek 
regions, that recorded high rates of economic growth before the financial crisis, have recorded 
the worst economic performances in Europe over the period 2001-2015 together with the Italian 
regions. 
According to Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), the quality of government institutions mainly 
reflects the social trust that characterizes a local community, and many empirical studies show 
that higher degrees of social trust are generally associated with higher levels of quality of 
government institutions. 
Lack of social trust within a community means that citizens have faith only in their family, 
clan or social group and this makes them less eager to contribute to the provision of general 
public goods, such as paying taxes, respecting and protecting public spaces and, very 
importantly, engaging in social and political mobilisations asking for improvements in quality of 
government. Generally speaking, free-riding becomes more frequent at all social levels. In turn, 
public authorities lack both adequate resources and incentives to deliver policies, consolidating 
a “vicious cycle” (Charron et all, 2012:10). 
In this framework, central governments in peripheral countries (especially in Italy and 
Greece) should focus their efforts on promoting a set of institutional reforms aimed at breaking 
up the nexus between the lack of social trust in local communities and political clientelism, thus 
reforms aimed at breaking the linkages between decentralised governance and rent extraction 
by private parties, social groups or local bureaucrats. These sets of reforms would be very 
effective especially in countries like Italy where central government assigns large autonomy to 
regional governments in the management and provision of costly public services in the 
framework of a process of progressive devolution of the power from the State to regions. 
However, given the fact that there is no a “one-size fits all” approach to curbing corruption, 
any measures must take into consideration the political, economic and social environment of a 
country and address the root causes of corruption rather than adopting a symptomatic approach 




(Lee-Jones, 2018). Such tailor-made institutional reforms should be accompanied by both the 
setup of independent national authorities responsible for monitoring and combatting corruption 
and the introduction of a more stringent code of laws to prosecute episodes of corruption of 
public officials or policy-makers.  
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Appendix 1. Composition and Definition of the EQI score. 
 
EQI score is developed by The Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenburg 
within the framework of a European Commission-funded project on measuring the Quality of 
Government Institutions in the European Regions. The index is built on the largest survey ever 
undertaken to measure the Quality of Government (EQoG). at the sub-national level. In order to 
capture the most relevant sub-national variation in EQoG, surveyors focus on three public 
services that are often financed, administrated and politically accounted for by subnational 
authorities: Education, Healthcare and Law Enforcement. Surveyors asked respondents “to rate 
these three public services with respect to three related concepts of QoG – the quality, the 
impartiality and the level of corruption of said services”. 
The regional data combine 16 survey questions about the Quality of Government in a region. 
To construct the regional index, surveyors followed carefully the guidelines provided in the 
“Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators; Methodology and User Guide” published in 
2008 by the OECD. All the QoG questions are aggregated from the individual to regional level. 
Next, the 16 regional scores are standardised so as to obtain a common range via 
standardisation. Then the standardised scores are assigned to three different groups named 
“pillars” containing scores related to question about impartiality, corruption and quality. Each 
variable is given the same weight in each pillar. Finally, the three pillars are combined using 
equal weighting to form the regional index (Charron et al., 2012). 
 
Appendix 2 
Multicollinearity occurs when a high correlation is detected among the predictors in a regression 
model. More precisely, multicollinearity arises when one of the regressors is a perfect linear 
combination of the other regressors. In the case of the model specified in this article, investment 
rates in the different sectors of the economy (or the share of a sector of the total GVA). may be 
correlated, especially averaged over the long period. For example, an increase in investment in 
the constructions, a very important steel-using sector, may be positively correlated to an 
increase in the investment rate in the manufacturing activity involved in the production of steel. 
A first possible strategy to check for multicollinearity is to examine the correlation matrix of the 
predictors, where correlation coefficients would indicate the presence of multicollinearity.  
Therefore, the pairwise correlation coefficients between two explanatory variables would be 
close to 1 if a regressor is a linear function of another regressor. 
Tables 10 and 11 report, respectively, the pairwise correlations between the classes of 








Table 10. Pairwise correlations between classes of investment rates. 


































0.0880 -0.0676 0.1690 0.2020 1 
 
Table 11. Pairwise correlations between the sectorial components of the total Gross Value Added. 














1     
Average GVA 
Construction  




-0.3552 0.1765 1   
Average GVA 
Market Services  
-0.6467 0.0798 -0.2434 1  
Average GVA 
Agriculture 
-0.0350 0.3607   0.1267 -0.0578 1 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9 shows the plot of the correlation matrix of investment rates and GVA shares, 
respectively. 








According to the correlation coefficients reported in Tables 10 and 11 (and their graphical 
representations), the predictors included in the models do not seem to be collinear or linearly 
dependent. Indeed, in Table 10, the larger correlation coefficient in absolute terms is the one 
detected between the investment rate in construction and investment rate in non-market 




services (-.55). In Table 11, the larger correlation coefficient in absolute terms is the one 
detected between industry GVA and GVA in market services (-.64). All the correlation 
coefficients in absolute values lay below the threshold of 0.50. 
Table 12. OLS version of the original probit models. Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth 
2001-2015. 
  Model 9a Model 9b 
Log  of GDP pc in 2001 
-.005***    -.009***    
[.001] [.002] 
EQI Score 
  .004***    .004***    
[.0008] [.0007] 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
.0001**    .0002***    
[.00005] [.00005] 
Working Age Population with 
Primary Education or Less 
-.0002***     -.0001***    
[.00004] [.00004] 
Investment in Industry to GDP 
.0008***    
 [.0001] 
Investment in Construction to GDP 
  .0010375    
 [0006] 
Investment in non-Market Services 
GDP 
.00005    
 [.0002] 
Investment in Market Services GDP 
-.00007    
 [.0001] 
Investment in Agriculture to GDP 
-.001*    
 [.0007] 
Average GVA Industry 
 
  .00003    
[.00009] 
Average GVA Construction  
 
  -.00006    
[.0002] 
Average GVA non-Market Services 
 
-.0003***    
 [.0001] 




Average GVA Agriculture 
 
-.0004***    
[.0001] 
Obs 202 202 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
R2 0,6 0,6 
***Statistically significant at 1% **Statistically significant at 5% * Statistically significant at 10% Standard Error in 
Brackets [ ] 





Although the correlation matrix analysis indicates that there exists no multicollinearity 
problem in the model, I also perform the Inflation Variance Factor (IVF) test. In order to perform 
this test, it is necessary to perform an OLS regression because the IVF is an index that 
measures to what extent the variance of the estimated regression coefficient is increased as a 
consequence of multicollinearity. Let Rj2 indicates the coefficient of determination of a 
regression equation in which xj is regressed on all the other predictors of the model. Let VIFj be 
determined as VIFj =1/ (1-Rj2). for j=1,2,…p-1. Therefore, when Rj2 is equal to 0 the VIFj would 
be equal to 1 (=1/ (1-02), meaning that the jth is not linearly related with the other predictors. 
Symmetrically when Rj2 is equal to 1 (the highest possible coefficient of determination), the VIFj 
would be equal to ∞  (=1/ (1-12), meaning the jth is linearly related with the other predictors. The 
rule to establish whether there exists multicollinearity within a model is provided by Montgomery 
(2001). that individuates VIF threshold values. If the VIF values exceed 5 or 10 it means that the 
model is poorly estimated because of the presence of multicollinearity. Table 12 shows the 
regression output of the OLS version of the Probit model whose dependent binary variable 
replaced with the average GDP per capita growth in the period 2001-2015. Also, the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita in 2001 is included in the linear regression in order to control for 
initial conditions. Once the OLS model has been estimated, it is possible to estimate the VIF for 
each variable. The estimation of the two models is reported in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. VIF. 
IVF Model 9a IVF Model 9b 
EQI Score 4.05 GVA Manufacturing Industry 4.44 
Working Age Population with 
Primary Education or Less 
3.48 Log of GDP pc in 2001 4.10 
Investment in Construction to 
GDP 
2.44 Market Services GVA 3.51 
Log of GDP pc in 2001 2.35 Non-Market Services GVA 3.42 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
2.35 
Working Age Population 
Primary Education or Less 
3.22 
Investment in non-Market 
Services GDP 
2.09 EQI Score 2.77 
Investment in Agriculture to 
GDP 
1.48 Construction GVA 2.11 
Investment in Maunufacturing 
Industry 
1.21 
Working Age Population with 
Tertiary Education 
2.07 
Investment in Market Services 
GDP 
1.18 Agriculture GVA 1.77 
 
 
The estimation of the VIFj’s confirms the absence of multicollinearity in the model. Furthermore, 
when running regression analysis with the econometric software, variables that are perfectly 
correlated are always automatically drop from the model in order to estimate the coefficients. 
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